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Editorial 
Following three years of low growth in the 
euro area, the first green shoots of recovery 
are appearing. Indeed, recent data have begun 
to send out encouraging signals suggesting 
that the trough of the cycle has been passed. 
The conditions for recovery during the 
second half of the year are falling into place, 
both on the domestic and the external side. 
Confidence is strengthening, monetary and 
financial conditions are accommodative, stock 
prices have rebounded significantly and 
inflation is expected to come down further. In 
the external environment, the global economy 
is gathering pace, with the US economy 
leading the recovery. Overall, upside and 
downside risks to the short-term growth 
outlook of the euro area are now much more 
balanced than a few months ago and activity 
should pick up gradually during the second 
half of the year.  
Excessive debt in the corporate sector has 
been a major source of economic weakness in 
the downturn and the strength of the 
forthcoming recovery will hinge on the 
financial situation of the private sector. In this 
respect it is important to note that the analysis 
presented in this report is encouraging. The 
so-called balance-sheet constraints are unlikely 
to be a substantial drag on the recovery. 
The downturn has prompted enterprises to 
cut costs and reduce debt. With data on 
corporate balance sheets only available up to 
2002, it is difficult to gauge the extent of the 
progress made in restoring enterprises’ 
balance sheets. However, recent indirect 
evidence - including tentative signs of a 
recovery in debt and equity financing as well 
as lower spreads on corporate bonds - 
suggests that balance sheet constraints have 
eased. Hence, companies should now be in a 
better position to take advantage of 
historically low interest rates to finance new 
investments.  
While household debt has continued to 
increase in the downturn, it is unlikely to act 
as a brake on consumption in the euro area as 
a whole. Households incurred new debt 
mostly to finance house purchases. For most 
Member States, house price increases would 
appear to be sustainable. Although the 
possibility of a housing-market bubble in 
some smaller or medium-sized Member States 
cannot be ruled out, their weight for the euro 
area is relatively small.  
Finally, recent indicators suggest that market 
concern about the health of the euro-area 
banking system has eased in recent months. 
Euro-area banks are generally profitable, well 
capitalised and maintain high solvency ratios. 
Bank equity prices have recovered while 
indicators of risk in the banking sector have 
also improved. Hence, the resilience of euro-
area banks should also help them to support a 
recovery in economic activity. Indeed, bank 
credit to the private sector has increased 
recently at a rate of 5%, which is more than 
the nominal GDP growth rate.  
The length of the current downturn has led 
some commentators to question the benefits 
of EMU for economic growth. Here, it is 
important to stress that, if anything, the euro 
is part of the solution, and certainly not the 
cause of the problem of sluggish growth in 
the euro area. This is clearly shown in the 
Focus Section of the present report which 
discusses the impact of EMU on trade and 
foreign direct investment. Enhanced market 
integration, via increased trade and foreign 
direct investment, features prominently 
among the expected benefits of an economic 
and monetary union. When it was launched, 
the euro was expected to boost trade flows 
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within the euro area through lower transaction 
costs and enhanced price transparency. It was 
also expected to make the euro area a more 
attractive place to invest in. The evidence 
presented in the report shows that these 
expectations are being largely fulfilled: EMU 
has already contributed significantly to 
enhanced cross-border integration in the euro 
area.  
Looking more in detail into the available 
evidence, all existing empirical studies find a 
positive impact of EMU on trade. Although 
there is some uncertainty as to the size of the 
impact of the euro on intra-euro-area trade 
flows, there is no doubt that the effect is 
positive and already substantial. In addition, 
the full impact of the euro has probably not 
yet been felt.  
An analysis of recent FDI flows indicates that 
the attractiveness of the euro area as a 
destination for foreign investment has 
increased significantly since the launch of the 
euro. In particular, EMU countries have 
attracted a rising share of total FDI inflows  
into the EU in recent years. The euro has 
stimulated primarily cross-border investment 
within the euro area but it is likely that it has 
also contributed to the strength of investment 
from non-EMU countries into the euro area.  
Increased cross-border integration is not just 
an objective in itself. It also has substantial 
positive implications for macroeconomic 
policies and long-term growth prospects. 
Trade is a source of cyclical synchronisation 
between Member States and thereby facilitates 
macroeconomic policy management in EMU. 
In addition, and in a more long-term 
perspective, increased trade and FDI lead to 
enhanced cross-border competition, faster 
productivity gains and, ultimately, faster 
growth and higher standards of living.  
 
Pedro SOLBES 
MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 
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I. Economic situation in the euro area  
Economic activity was weaker than anticipated in the second quarter of 2003 but recent confidence surveys, leading 
indicators and hard data have begun to send out encouraging signals suggesting that the trough of the cycle has been 
passed. Business confidence in services has strengthened steadily since the spring. Early signs of an upturn in the 
manufacturing sector have also become visible. Finally, consumer confidence is improving slowly but steadily. Overall, 
recent developments are a cause for cautious optimism as the factors for a pick-up of activity during the second half of the 
year are falling into place. The international environment is clearly improving and conditions are also becoming more 
conducive to domestic demand. Monetary and financial conditions are supportive and there are indirect signs that 
balance sheet constraints have begun to ease. Decelerating inflation will also foster private consumption. Although risks 
to the short-term outlook remain significant, they are now more balanced than a few months ago.  
1. Economic situation1 
GDP fell marginally in Q2 but surveys and 
some hard data suggest that the trough of 
the cycle has been passed  
Available data confirm the weakness of activity 
in the euro area during the first half of the year. 
Eurostat’s latest estimate shows a mild quarter-
on-quarter contraction of GDP of 0.1% in the 
second quarter, coming on top of a slight 
downward revision of growth in the first 
quarter from 0.1% to 0%. The second-quarter 
                                                      
1 The cut-off date for statistics included in this issue was 
29 September 2003.  
contraction in activity was spearheaded by a 
significant slowdown in domestic demand. 
Private spending came in weaker than 
anticipated, investment pursued its downward 
course and the contribution to growth from the 
re-building of inventories was more modest 
than during the first months of the year. These 
negative developments were only partly offset 
by a less negative contribution of net trade to 
growth than in the previous quarter.  
Notwithstanding weaker than expected data for 
the first half of the year, confidence surveys  
Table 1: Euro-area growth components
2002 Q3 2002 Q4 2003Q1 2003Q2 Overhang2003 H1
% change on previous quarter, volumes(1)
GDP 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2
Private consumption 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.1 1.0
Government consumption 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.4
Gross fixed capital formation 0.1 0.2 -1.2 -0.4 -1.6
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) -0.4 -0.4 0.1 0.1       ---
Exports of goods and services 1.5 -0.4 -1.2 -0.5 -0.5
Imports of goods and services 1.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.6
% contribution to change in GDP
Private consumption 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.6
Government consumption 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3
Gross fixed capital formation 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3
Changes in inventories -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.5
Net exports 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.8
(1) Annual change in % for overhang.
Source : Commission services.
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have begun to send encouraging signals during 
the last few months. Household sentiment has 
improved slowly but almost steadily since May 
on the back of a more positive assessment of 
the general economic outlook and weakening 
concerns on unemployment. As to business 
sentiment, an upturn is clearly visible in the 
service sector. Confidence has strengthened 
significantly since the spring in DG ECFIN’s 
surveys of services and, to a lesser degree, retail 
trade. Reuters’ services index has increased 
steadily since June and now stands above the 50 
level which separates expansion from 
contraction. 
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The manufacturing sector has also begun to 
send out early signals of an improvement over 
the summer. DG ECFIN’s business climate 
indicator rebounded significantly in August and 
September. Although remaining below 50, the 
PMI index increased significantly in July and 
August (see next Graph).  
Manufacturing confidence, euro area 
40
45
50
55
60
65
Jan-00 Jul-00 Jan-01 Jul-01 Jan-02 Jul-02 Jan-03 Jul-03
-2
-1
0
1
2
PMI
Business Climate Indicator (rhs)
Source: Commission services, Reuters.  
Other leading indicators have also begun to 
point upwards. The OECD’s composite leading 
indicator for the euro area was up for the third 
consecutive month in July. Furthermore, a few 
national surveys which are generally considered 
as having some predictive power for activity in 
the euro area as a whole have also improved in 
recent months. IFO’s business climate index 
has increased continuously since May. The 
NBB manufacturing indicator has strengthened 
over the summer.  
Finally, it is encouraging to note that, the 
strengthening of business confidence does not 
rest exclusively on enhanced expectations but is 
also, to some extent, backed by a better 
Table 2: Selected euro area and national leading indicators, 2002-2003
SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI4) Reuters Ser7) IFO5) NBB6) ZEW
Long-term average 96.2 0.00 2.9 52.2 54.2 101.5 -7.6 43.8
Trough in latest
downturn
94.7 -1.24 -3.3 42.9 46.7 89.7 -21.1 -10.4
November 2002 95.3 -0.27 2.3 49.4 50.8 95.9 -9.0 4.2
December 2002 95.1 -0.23 1.6 48.4 50.6 97.9 -12.9 0.6
January 2003 94.9 -0.33 1.2 49.3 50.0 98.1 -15.5 14.0
February 2003 95.1 -0.27 0.5 50.1 48.9 98.4 -10.5 15.0
March 2003 94.6 -0.63 0.2 48.4 47.7 97.2 -17.4 17.7
April 2003 94.7 -0.53 0.1 47.8 47.7 95.0 -20.5 18.4
May 2003 94.8 -0.63 0.8 46.8 47.9 97.3 -18.3 18.7
June 2003 94.8 -0.65 1.7 46.4 48.2 98.7 -26.5 21.3
July 2003 94.6 -0.87 2.1 48.0 50.2 100.2 -19.3 41.9
August 2003 95.0 -0.48 49.1 52.0 102.2 -14.3 52.5
September 2003 95.4 -0.42 105.2 -14.5 60.9
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator, six monthly change.
4) Reuters Purchasing managers index, manufacturing. 5) Business expectations, West Germany. 6) National Bank of Belgium indicator for
manufacturing. 7) Reuters Services purchasing manager index.
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assessment of enterprises’ past and current 
situation. This is quite clear in DG ECFIN’s 
survey of the service sector where the 
assessment of past demand trends has increased 
more rapidly than the assessment of future 
demand trends. Such a development stands in 
stark contrast with the short-lived recovery of 
confidence in 2002, during which sentiment 
was essentially driven by expectations. The 
situation is more mixed in the manufacturing 
sector where, according to DG ECFIN’s 
survey, the assessment of recent production 
trends increased noticeably in August before 
falling somewhat in September.  
Some hard data have also begun to send 
positive signals. According to Eurostat’s latest 
estimate, euro-area industrial production 
increased by 0.7% from June to July. Year-on-
year growth in retail sales was also up from 
0.4% in May to 0.7% in June. 
Conditions are in place for a pick-up of 
activity in the second half of the year 
The factors are in place for a better second half 
of the year. The international environment is 
clearly improving and conditions are also 
becoming more conducive to domestic 
demand.  
In the external environment, there are signs of 
improved growth trends emerging in many 
parts of the world. In particular, growth is 
accelerating in the USA (see Box 1 on next 
page) and the Japanese economy is performing 
above expectations. As a result, the euro area is 
expected to benefit from a strengthening of 
external demand in the coming months.  
As regards domestic demand, the strong euro 
helps in bringing inflation down and supporting 
purchasing power while low interest rates 
alleviate the burden of debt for both 
households and enterprises. Recent indirect 
evidence suggests that balance sheet constraints 
in the corporate sector have eased in recent 
months (see Section 2). In addition, concerns 
about the health of the banking sector have 
receded. As a result, capital cost considerations 
should progressively regain a more significant 
role in companies’ investment decisions. Low 
interest rates and rising stock prices therefore 
pave the way for stronger capital formation. In 
this respect, it is encouraging to note a tentative 
pick-up in the growth of debt financing in the 
euro area.  
Based on the above factors, a gradual pick-up in 
economic activity is foreseen in the second half 
of 2003. The indicator-based quarterly GDP 
forecast for the euro area, developed by 
DG ECFIN, points to quarter-on-quarter 
growth for the third quarter of 2003 in the 
range of 0% to 0.4%. The model suggests an 
acceleration in the fourth quarter to a range of 
0.2% to 0.6%. Based on the mid-range values, 
the average growth rate should be at around 
0.5% for 2003 as a whole. 
Euro area : GDP growth rate
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Source: Commission services.  
Substantial uncertainty still surrounds the short-
term outlook but risks are now more balanced 
than a few months ago.  
Downside risks exist both on the external and 
the domestic side. On the external side, the 
global upturn will hinge on the sustainability of 
the recovery in the USA and, to a lesser degree, 
in Japan. For the euro area, the strength of the 
export recovery will also depend on the external 
value of the euro. On the domestic side, the 
deceleration of private consumption in the 
second quarter contrasts with the relative 
resilience of household spending in the 
previous four quarters. Although it is likely to 
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Box 1: The economic situation in the USA  
The recovery in the United States has been gaining momentum lately with consumer spending advancing 
strongly and business investment picking up. The preliminary GDP estimate for the second quarter shows an 
annualised real growth rate of 3.1%. Recent economic data indicate that third-quarter growth will be even 
stronger. An abatement of geopolitical uncertainties, fiscal expansion and an accommodative monetary policy 
have all contributed to this rebound. 
According to the IMF, the fiscal deficit of general government may surge to 6% of GDP in 2003 following 
the latest tax cuts and the higher defence spending in connection with the Iraq War. The Federal Reserve 
lowered its target for the federal funds rate by 25 basis points to only 1% in June. Subsequently, the Fed has 
stated that it believes that the accommodative stance of monetary policy can be maintained for a considerable 
period. 
In spite of the economy picking up speed, the labour market has so far failed to improve. Between 
November 2001 - when the last recession ended - and August 2003, the number of nonfarm payrolls has 
fallen by 0.9%. The unemployment rate is up by half a percentage point to 6.1% over the same period. The 
downward trend in employment during a recovery phase reflects extraordinarily strong productivity growth 
over the past two years. The labour market weakness poses the risk that the recovery will not have become 
self-sustaining when the macro-economic stimulus eventually diminishes. 
Inflation has been held to a low level by slack in resource utilisation and the sizeable advances in labour 
productivity. CPI core inflation fell to 1.3% in August on a year-over-year basis, compared to 2.2% for the 
overall index. However, the risk of deflation seems to have become very remote considering the momentum 
which the economy has gained over the summer months. 
The international competitiveness of US goods and services remains weak. The dollar's real effective 
exchange rate fell by 7% between February 2002 and August 2003, but it remains 9% higher than its average 
since 1990, according to the Federal Reserve's broad dollar index. The balance-of-payments situation has 
continued to deteriorate in the current year. In the first six months, the trade deficit increased to 4.6% of 
GDP from 4.0% in 2002 while the current account deficit climbed to 5.2% of GDP from 4.6% in 2002. The 
long-standing concern about the external imbalance has been aggravated by the fact that the current account 
deficit now fully reflects a domestic fiscal deficit, a so-called 'twin-deficit' situation. If the current account 
deficit were to be corrected in a disorderly way, it would have a clear dampening effect on world growth. 
US GDP growth since the last recession
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be just a temporary blip, it may also herald 
more cautious spending on the back of rising 
unemployment. Some uncertainty is also 
attached to the factors that have been 
hindering corporate spending in the 
downturn. Recent evidence on the easing of 
balance sheet constraints is only indirect. 
Furthermore, the inventory build-up observed 
since the beginning of the year is difficult to 
interpret and could be a technical correction 
rather than the signal of an upturn in the 
inventory cycle (see Section 3). 
Upside risks are mainly related to domestic 
demand. Macroeconomic policies are 
supportive and inflation is expected to 
decline. In addition, political uncertainties 
related to the global context and to the 
continuation of structural reforms in the euro 
area may fade away. This combination of 
positive factors could trigger a release of pent-
up demand both from households and 
enterprises. In particular, as private saving 
rates are above their long-term average, there 
is scope for a rapid increase of consumption.  
The short-term outlook for employment 
remains sluggish 
Employment growth has come to a standstill 
since the second half of 2002. Year-on-year 
growth, which peaked at over 2.0% in 2000, 
fell to 0.1% in the first quarter of 2003. Short-
term prospects for employment remain 
sluggish as further progress in productivity is 
necessary to maintain profitability and 
competitiveness and as labour market 
developments always lag behind economic 
trends.  
After a significant pick-up in the first three 
quarters of 2002, labour productivity has 
remained nearly flat on a quarter-to-quarter 
basis in the past two quarters, leading to a 
slight erosion of profit margins after a year of 
steady improvement. In the absence of timely 
data, more recent developments in 
profitability are difficult to assess but it is 
likely that a strong euro is exerting pressures 
on profitability in the export sector. Further 
cost-cutting will probably take place in the 
corporate sector when the economy begins to 
gather momentum. The sluggish short-term 
prospects for employment are supported by 
developments in recent business surveys. 
Some surveys have shown a slight 
improvement in the assessment of 
employment over the summer – Reuters PMI 
and Reuters services - but the levels of these 
indicators remain low.  
Labour productivity and profitability, euro area
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Source: Commission services, ECB.  
After remaining virtually stable during most of 
2001, the unemployment rate has drifted 
steadily upwards since the end of 2001, 
increasing by close to 1 percentage point to 
reach 8.9% in July. Concerns related to 
unemployment have contributed to 
undermine private spending over the last two 
years and are likely to continue to be a drag 
on private consumption over the coming 
months. However, it is encouraging to note 
that households’ worries on unemployment 
have receded slightly over the summer. 
Inflation is receding slowly  
After peaking at 2.4% in February and March, 
headline inflation decelerated somewhat in the 
spring before edging up again in the summer 
to reach 2.1% in August. The recent pick-up 
essentially reflects higher energy and food 
prices. Core inflation, as measured by the 
HICP excluding energy and unprocessed 
food, eased modestly between April and July 
before accelerating very slightly again in 
August to reach 1.9%. 
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Headline and core inflation, euro area 
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Overall, the slow speed of deceleration of 
inflation since the spring reflects essentially 
two factors. 
Firstly, oil prices, which had declined sharply 
after the beginning of the war in Iraq, have 
rebounded appreciably. Brent oil prices 
bottomed out at $23 per barrel at the end of 
April 2003, but rose to just below $30 per 
barrel at the end of August before easing 
again somewhat in September. The price rise 
since spring reflects a number of supply-side 
factors, including the difficulty in restoring the 
rate of Iraq’s oil production, political 
uncertainty in Venezuela and Nigeria, and 
relatively low stock levels, particularly in the 
USA.  
Secondly, core inflation is easing only 
gradually owing to sluggish productivity 
growth and a slow pass-through of the 
appreciation of the euro into domestic prices. 
With growth in labour compensation slightly 
up to 2.7% year-on-year and slow productivity 
gains, the first quarter of 2003 has seen an 
uptick of growth in unit labour costs to y-o-y 
1.8%, against 1.4% in the last quarter of 2002. 
As to the appreciation of the euro, import 
prices in the second quarter of 2003 were only 
1.6% lower than a year before based on 
quarterly national account data. Over the 
same period, the euro effective exchange rate 
appreciated by 15% based on quarterly 
averages. As national accounts for the euro 
area do not separate extra-euro-area from 
intra-euro area trade, import prices also 
capture developments in domestic prices. 
Furthermore, recent developments in import 
prices have been affected by fluctuations in oil 
prices. However, the relatively slow pass-
through is confirmed by the analysis of 
monthly import prices for manufactured 
goods. In May 2002, manufactured import 
prices were only 6% lower than a year before. 
Over the same period, the euro effective 
exchange rate had appreciated by 16%. These 
data suggest that the impact of the 
appreciation of the euro on import prices has 
not been fully felt at this juncture.  
Core inflation is expected to continue to 
decline, albeit at a slow pace, over the next 
months as a result of a sizeable output gap, 
low imported inflation and the pass-trough 
effect of declining inflation in industrial 
producer prices. In addition, survey data on 
producers’ and consumers’ inflation 
expectations point to declining price trends. 
Headline inflation, on the other hand, may be 
more volatile due to weather-related price 
spikes for food and energy price movements.  
Monetary and financial conditions remain 
supportive 
In July and August 2003, the Monetary 
Conditions Index (MCI)2 was at a level similar 
to that seen in spring 2003. In May, the MCI 
had moved in the direction of tighter 
conditions as a consequence of the higher 
level of the euro real effective exchange rate. 
The appreciation was partly reversed between 
mid-June and August. This development, 
together with a decrease in the real short-term 
interest rate, brought an easing of monetary 
conditions over the summer. Although the 
MCI is not yet available for September, the 
renewed appreciation of the euro since the 
beginning of September is likely to have 
entailed somewhat tighter monetary 
conditions that month.  
                                                      
2  The MCI tries to capture the combined impact on 
economic activity of changes in the real effective 
exchange rate and the real short-term interest rate.  
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Monetary conditions, euro area
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After a period of sharp decline, government 
bond yields have rebounded significantly since 
mid-June. End of September, long-term yields 
in the euro area were about 60 basis points 
above their low in June. The rise was even 
higher in the case of US bonds at about 90 
basis points. Nevertheless, long-term interest 
rates in the euro area remain lower than at the 
beginning of the year.  
The reversal in global long-term interest rates 
largely reflects cyclical developments. Since 
2000, a number of cyclical factors have 
resulted in lower bond yields, including a 
sharp fall in corporate investment, 
expectations of sustained accommodative 
monetary policies on the back of sluggish 
growth and some worries about deflation 
risks. Since mid-June, these factors have been 
operating in reverse as market expectations of 
a global recovery have strengthened and 
concern about deflation has proven 
unfounded.  
In addition, portfolio reallocation effects have 
also played a role. A portfolio shift out of 
equities and into fixed-income investments 
during the equity-market correction was 
another source of downward pressures on 
long-term yields in the economic downturn. 
While bond yields and equity prices have 
largely moved in tandem since 2000, the 
recovery in equity prices since mid-March 
2003 was initially accompanied by a further 
fall in bond yields (see next graph). The recent 
correction in bond prices therefore reconciles 
the views of the bond and equity markets on 
the outlook for the global economy. 
Long-term interest rates and stock prices, euro area
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Finally, the deterioration in government 
budget balances has also put upward pressure 
on global bond yields in recent months. Due 
to a sharper deterioration of fiscal balances 
this effect has so far probably been more 
pronounced in the USA than in the euro area. 
However, there is a risk that the impact of 
worsening public finance could be magnified 
in the euro area by a perceived weakening of 
long-term fiscal discipline if the existing fiscal 
framework were to lose its credibility.  
Corporate bond issuance has rebounded from 
its low level in 2002 with a narrowing in 
corporate spreads and declining premiums in 
credit default swaps. In addition, July data 
show that long-term interest rates on bank 
loans to households and the corporate sector 
are still on a downward path. Together with a 
sharp recovery in stocks prices, which end of 
September were about 30% above their low in 
March in the euro area, these developments 
mean that long-term financing conditions 
remain supportive for the corporate sector. In 
contrast, the implications of the recent rise in 
government bond yields could be more 
worrying for households in those countries 
where mortgage-related household debt is 
high and where housing prices have been 
rising rapidly.  
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2. Balance sheets constraints in the 
private sector 
The outlook for economic growth will 
crucially be shaped by the condition of 
private-sector balance sheets. Typically, 
companies and households tend to borrow 
against their expected earnings in an 
economic upswing and tend to consolidate 
their debts in the downswing. Amid a 
pronounced cyclical upswing, leverage ratios 
in both corporate and household sectors rose 
substantially in the course of the 1990s. The 
subsequent economic downturn has been 
long but shallow by normal standards and has 
been characterised by some de-leveraging of 
the corporate sector, a steady increase in 
household debt and concerns about the 
financial health of the banking sector. In this 
context, a key question is whether balance 
sheet constraints will act as a brake on the 
forthcoming recovery in the euro area.  
Non-financial corporate sector 
Corporate debt levels have acted as a drag on 
investment during the current economic 
downturn. With data on corporate balance 
sheets only available to 2002, it is difficult to 
assess the extent of the progress already made 
in restoring balance sheets. However, recent 
indirect evidence suggests that balance sheet 
constraints have eased in recent months. This 
includes tentative signs of a recovery of debt 
and equity financing, higher equity prices, 
lower spreads on corporate bonds and, to a 
lesser degree, some improvements in 
profitability.  
Non-financial corporate sector debt (1), euro area
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(1) Loans by monetary and financial institutions to non-financial corporations.
Source: ECB.  
Companies in the euro-area economy have 
responded to financial pressures by reducing 
investment, inventories and debt. The total 
stock of debt of the euro-area non-financial 
corporate sector has broadly stabilised, in 
terms of GDP, since the beginning of 2002. 
Companies have also modified the term 
structure of their debt, reducing significantly 
the share of short-term borrowing after mid 
2001 (see previous graph).  
There are now signs of a tentative pick-up in 
the growth of debt financing in the euro area. 
Issuance of corporate debt securities 
accelerated to an annual rate of 12.7% in the 
second quarter of 2003 (from 4.1% at the end 
of 2002). There is also some recovery in 
secondary issuance of equity, although IPO 
activity has remained weak. Bank loans to 
euro-area non-financial enterprises expanded 
by 3.6% during the second quarter of 2003, 
confirming the broad stabilisation of growth 
recorded since the end of last year.  
Table 3: Balance sheets of the non-financial corporate sector, euro area
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Debt /GDP 52.2 54.0 58.8 61.3 61.4
Debt / equity 110.6 80.8 94.7 120.0 182.9
Short-term debt/total debt 30.3 31.2 32.9 32.2 30.0
Net incurrence of liabilities/GDP 7.9 11.5 16.3 10.7 6.1
    Debt financing 4.7 7.6 9.6 6.0 3.3
    Equity financing 3.1 3.6 6.6 4.5 2.6
Source : ECB.
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Bank lending to the corporate sector (1), euro area
(annual rate of growth)
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(1) Loans by monetary and financial institutions to non-financial corporations.
Source: ECB.  
In the period 2001-2002, much of the decline 
in risk-free interest rates was not transmitted 
to the corporate sector, as spreads on both 
corporate bonds and on bank loans widened. 
However, as shown in the graph below, there 
has been a sharp narrowing in spreads on 
corporate bonds in 2003.  
Corporate bonds, euro area 
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Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.  
Recent developments are somewhat less 
positive for bank loans. Typically, bond 
spreads anticipate movements in bank-loan 
spreads. However, there is so far no clear 
evidence that the widening of margins 
between lending rates and comparable market 
interest rates has come to an end. This is 
consistent with the reportedly cautious 
attitude of euro-area banks in extending loans 
to enterprises.3 
                                                      
3  See the July 2003 ECB bank lending survey for the 
euro area, summarised in the ECB Monthly Bulletin 
of August 2003. The survey indicates that banks were 
still, on balance, tightening credit standards, although 
Long-term bank lending interest rate and comparable 
market rate, euro area
2
3
4
5
6
7
Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03
to enterprises over 1 year
5-year government bond yield
%
Source: ECB.  
Labour productivity and profitability picked 
up significantly in the euro area in 2002, an 
improvement which should support the 
forthcoming recovery. However, since the 
beginning of 2003, developments in profit 
margins have been slightly less favourable due 
to a near stagnation of productivity. 
Furthermore, euro-area companies, which had 
made substantial investments in the United 
States in the phase of dollar appreciation, have 
also suffered from the negative impact of the 
subsequent dollar depreciation on the book 
value of such investments and on the 
revenues from the activity of their US 
subsidiaries.  
Profit margins,(1) euro area
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(1) Gross operating surplus as a share of GDP. 
Source: Commission services, ECB.  
                                                                          
the percentage of those doing so dropped significantly 
from April to July. 
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Household sector 
Households have continued to accumulate 
debt in the course of the economic downturn, 
mostly to finance house purchases. In the 
euro area, mortgage lending growth remained 
above a robust 7% annual rate in the first two 
quarters of 2003. Mortgage lending growth 
has generally been strongest in those Member 
States where house prices have increased most 
– such as Greece, Spain, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands (see Table 4).  
Rising debt levels have increased the 
vulnerability of household spending to 
adverse developments in other sectors of the 
economy. While household borrowing has 
reached abnormally high levels in some 
countries, the interest burden has been 
contained by the sharp decline in nominal and 
real interest rates. However, the high level of 
indebtedness exposes borrowers (and lenders) 
to a fall in households’ income or a rise in 
interest rates – especially where mortgage 
contracts include variable or short-term 
adjustable interest rates.  
While the possibility of a housing-market 
bubble exists in several Member States, the 
risks have declined in some cases. Ireland, 
Greece and Spain still experienced a double-
digit increase in nominal house prices in 2002, 
while substantial but less marked increases 
were recorded in Belgium, France and Italy. 
However, prices began to decelerate in the 
Netherlands and Ireland in the course of the 
year. 
Household debt, euro area 
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A significant increase in interest rates or a 
further deterioration of the labour market, 
could trigger a reversal in house-price inflation 
and bring about a sizeable correction in the 
housing markets of some Member States. 
However, for the euro area as a whole, the 
risk that balance sheet constraints might act as 
a brake on consumption appears low at the 
present juncture.  
The banking sector 
Risk indicators suggest that market concern 
about the health of the euro-area banking 
system has eased. Bank equity prices have 
recovered in line with broader market indices 
(see next Graph), while other indicators of 
risk - such as credit default swap prices - have 
also improved on average. 
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Table 4: Nominal property prices, euro area
(annual change in %)
Residential
property
Household debt
1995-02 2002 1995-02 2002
BE 5.2 6.5 5.1 1.5
DE 0.0 1.0 4.4 2.5
ES 9.8 17.4 13.2 6.2
FR 4.8 6.7 6.2 6.2
IR 14.5 14.2
IT 3.7 10.0 8.1 6.3
NL 11.2 4.5 12.7 7.0
FI 8.2 8.7 4.3 4.7
Source: BIS
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The assessment by credit rating agencies of 
the national banking sectors within the euro 
area is generally good, in line with official 
statements by supervisors. However, risk 
indicators continue to exhibit a wide 
dispersion around the upper band – 
particularly when compared to the situation in 
the USA and the United Kingdom - pointing 
to the existence of certain problem cases.  
Euro-area banks are generally profitable, 
despite a sharp deceleration in corporate 
lending, and remain well capitalised with 
sound solvency ratios. With falling 
commission income and rising loan-loss 
provisions, bank profitability has been 
supported mainly by retail activity, and more 
specifically by the buoyancy of household 
lending. Profitability has also benefited from 
significant cost-cutting and business 
restructuring, e.g. via the closure or selling of 
investment banking activities, insurance 
subsidiaries, specialised credit providers, etc.  
In addition, the percentage of non-performing 
loans over total loans in banks’ balance sheets 
has stayed relatively low (3.6% in 2002) 
compared to previous downturns. All in all, 
the deterioration in asset quality and reduced 
profits have not impaired the average 
solvency of euro-area banks. Capital ratios 
have been maintained at high levels, and even 
increased slightly in 2002, indicating that most 
banks still have the capability to absorb 
further potential losses.  
In general, concerns about the health of the 
euro-area banking sector have eased. 
Nevertheless, the resilience of the euro-area 
banking sector has not completely dispelled 
more specific concerns. First, the counterpart 
of buoyant mortgage markets in some 
Member States has been a sharp rise in their 
banks’ exposure to the real estate sector. 
Second, the delay in economic recovery 
means that the buffers available to banks are 
somewhat reduced, and parts of the banking 
system could be vulnerable to further 
sustained weakness in the real sector and/or 
renewed weakness in equity markets. At this 
stage, however, the health of the banking 
sector is not a source of concern for the 
recovery of the economy. 
3. Assessing recent developments in 
inventories 
Changes in inventories are the most volatile of 
the expenditure components of GDP and can 
be a major source of cyclical fluctuations in 
activity. Changes in inventories have played an 
important role in the euro area in the present 
downturn. In real terms, stocks were scaled 
down steadily between the first quarter of 
2001 and the last quarter of 2002 before 
increasing again in the first half of this year  
(see next graph). 
Table 5: Key indicators for euro-area banks
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Credit quality
  Loan Loss Res / Gross Loans 2.82 2.77 2.59 2.58 2.68
  Loan Loss Res / Impaired Loans 72.43 74.16 77.41 88.82 74.63
  Impaired Loans / Gross Loans 3.90 3.73 3.35 2.91 3.60
Solvency
  Equity / Tot Assets 4.03 4.06 4.28 4.17 4.32
Profitability
  Return On Avg Assets (ROAA) 0.44 0.52 0.73 0.43 0.27
  Return On Avg Equity (ROAE) 11.17 12.96 17.42 10.29 6.38
Source: Bankscope – Based on the 140 largest banks.
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Changes in inventories, euro area 
(share of GDP)
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The adjustment has been more moderate in 
nominal terms. As shown on the graph above, 
there are noticeable, and unusual, differences 
in the changes in real and nominal inventories 
between late 1999 and late 2002. Whether 
these differences are a statistical artefact or 
reflect genuine changes in the relative price of 
stocks is difficult to assess. In general, 
prudence is required when analysing both real 
and nominal developments in stocks. For a 
number of reasons, changes in inventories as 
provided in national account data may be 
difficult to interpret. In particular, it is worth 
stressing that: 
¾ In several Member State, changes in 
inventories are measured as a residual in 
the identity linking GDP and its 
expenditure components. In these cases, 
changes in inventories also cover errors 
and statistical discrepancies. 
¾ Inventory data may be subject to 
significant revisions.  
¾ The inventory component of national 
accounts covers both actual changes in 
inventories and acquisition less disposal 
of valuables.  
A strong inventory cycle  
Putting recent developments in perspective, 
the inventory contraction registered in 2001-
02 started earlier in the cycle and was more 
protracted than during the 1992-93 recession - 
8 successive quarters of contraction against 6. 
The depletion of stocks shaved off close to 
2% of real GDP growth in 2001-02 against 
slightly more than 2% of GDP in 1992-93.  
The 2001-02 inventory contraction looks 
particularly sharp when measured against the 
overall strength of the cycle. As stock building 
takes place predominantly in the industrial 
sector, changes in inventories tend to be 
relatively strongly correlated with growth in 
industrial production.4 However, in 2001-2002 
more inventory adjustment took place than 
would have been warranted given the strength 
of the industrial cycle and past historical 
patterns.  
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This can be verified formally with a simple 
estimated equation relating real changes in 
inventories to year-on-year changes in 
industrial production. The equation performs 
relatively well over the 1990s but predicts a 
systematically higher level of inventories than 
actually observed in 2000-02.5 The difference 
is shown in the graph above which plots 
actual real changes in inventories and changes 
in real inventories as predicted by the 
                                                      
4  The correlation between year-on-year growth in 
industrial production and changes in inventories 
exceeds 60% over the past decade. 
5  The equation relates real changes in inventories to 
growth in industrial output and lagged changes in 
inventories. It was estimated on quarterly data for the 
1991-1999 and has the usual good statistical 
properties. It explains about 50% of the variance of 
changes in inventories.  
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equation. Since the beginning of 2003, 
developments in stocks seem to have come 
back to more normal levels.  
Assessing inventory recovery  
The adjustment of inventories seems to be 
over since the beginning of 2003. During the 
first two quarters of the year, changes in 
stocks made a cumulative contribution to 
GDP growth of about 0.4 percentage points 
in the euro area. This turnaround has fuelled 
hopes that the downward phase of the 
inventory cycle could be over and that stock 
building could make a positive contribution to 
growth in the second half of the year. 
However, recent developments must be 
considered with prudence as national accounts 
and surveys have recently sent conflicting 
signals.  
Business surveys are frequently used to assess 
recent developments in inventories. The 
correlation between survey indicators and 
changes in inventories as measured in national 
accounts is generally reasonably high. In the 
case of DG ECFIN’s manufacturing survey, 
the correlation ranges between 65 and 80% 
depending on the concept considered. 
Interestingly, the correlation is significantly 
higher when using inventory data from 
national account data in nominal terms rather 
than real terms. This may reflect the fact that 
enterprises are assessing their stocks on the 
basis of their costs rather than their volumes. 
The next graph plots the stock component of 
the manufacturing survey of DG ECFIN. 
After a long period of relative stability, the 
indicator deteriorated appreciably in the 
summer, suggesting that producers currently 
assess the level of their inventories as 
somewhat too high. In any event, the 
indicator’s recent developments do not 
foreshadow a sustainable upturn of the 
inventory cycle.  
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Overall, the increase of inventories, as 
measured in the national accounts, appears 
fragile. It may mark a return to more 
“normal” behaviour relative to historical 
patterns after an exceptionally sharp 
downswing in investment. In this context, the 
strength of the inventory adjustment in 2001-
02 may have been a reflection of strong 
balance-sheet constraints and the fact that 
inventories have played an important role in 
the cost-cutting process in the corporate 
sector. The build-up of inventories observed 
since the beginning of the year could then be 
interpreted as another sign of the 
improvement of the financial situation in the 
corporate sector (see Section 2).  
However, the possibility of a shift in the 
relation between the inventory cycle and the 
manufacturing cycle since the late 1990s 
cannot be excluded. Such a shift could, for 
instance, be a consequence of improved 
inventory management due to the use of 
information technologies and of the 
widespread development of lean production 
techniques. In that case, the recent built-up of 
stocks would appear fragile and the 
contribution of inventories to the 
forthcoming recovery more modest than 
generally expected. Such an interpretation 
would be in line with recent developments in 
the assessment of stocks in manufacturing 
surveys.  
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Focus  
II. The impact of  EMU on trade and FDI  
Enhanced market integration, via increased trade and foreign direct investment, features prominently among the 
expected benefits of an economic and monetary union. This focus reviews the available evidence on the impact of EMU 
on trade and FDI since the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999. Its main conclusion is that EMU has already 
contributed significantly to enhance cross-border integration in the euro area. Existing empirical evidence points to a 
sizeable positive effect of EMU on intra-euro-area trade, with an impact ranging between 5 and 50% depending on the 
studies considered. The effect does not seem to have reached its maximum yet and the upper end of the range is a more 
plausible estimate of the potential long-run impact than its lower end. An analysis of recent FDI flows also indicates 
that the attractiveness of the euro area as a destination for foreign investment has increased significantly since the launch 
of the euro. In particular, EMU countries have attracted a rising share of total FDI inflows into the EU in recent 
years. However, FDI is determined by a large number of factors and further work is required to determine the exact 
contribution of the euro introduction.  
1. The impact of EMU on trade and 
FDI: possible channels 
Monetary integration and trade 
Economic theory clearly predicts a positive 
impact of the euro on trade flows between 
EMU Member States. There are basically 
three channels through which monetary 
integration can affect trade.  
Lower transaction costs. A single currency allows 
exporters or customers to save on the 
transaction costs associated with the 
management of multiple currencies. 
Transaction costs include conversion charges 
on the spot exchange rate market, the cost of 
hedging against currency fluctuations, in-
house costs associated with the management 
of multiple currencies and banking charges on 
cross-border payments. In 1990, these 
transaction costs were estimated at about 0.3-
0.4% of GDP in the EU as an average.6 
Exchange rate stability. Exchange rate volatility 
can hamper trade despite the existence of 
well-developed markets for currency hedging. 
In practice, exporters cannot insure 
themselves adequately against all forms of 
                                                      
6  See European Commission (1990). 
exchange rate risks. In particular, hedging can 
be more costly for currencies which are not 
traded intensively on world financial markets. 
In addition, available hedging instruments are 
essentially of a short-term nature. There are 
reasons to believe that trade is also affected by 
medium to long-term fluctuations in real 
exchange rates.7 Hedging against such 
medium to long-term risks is in most cases 
difficult or even impossible.  
Price transparency. A single currency facilitates 
cross-border comparisons of prices, thereby 
enhancing cross-border competition and 
increasing trade flows. In this context, EMU 
may be considered as a crucial complement to 
the EU’s Single Market programme.  
Overall, through these three channels, the 
euro should foster intra-euro-area trade flows 
and thereby contribute to a better allocation 
of resources within EMU.  
                                                      
7  In particular, trade is frequently associated with sunk 
costs including the build-up of specialised knowledge 
or the establishment of local distribution networks. In 
these cases, the risk of persistent deviations of 
exchange rates from their equilibrium value may act as 
a deterrent to trade. 
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Monetary integration and FDI 
Contrary to trade, economic theory is less 
clear-cut as to the impact of a single currency 
on FDI flows. Reflecting the multiplicity of 
factors affecting investment decisions, a large 
number of theoretical models have been 
proposed that conclude either in a positive or 
a negative effect of monetary integration on 
foreign investment.8  
To illustrate some of the possible arguments, 
it is useful to distinguish between trade-
substituting and trade-creating FDI. Foreign 
direct investment can be a substitute for trade 
if it aims at bypassing trade restrictions and at 
servicing the local market. It can also be a 
source of trade if it aims at boosting exports 
to the local market9 or at producing for re-
exports by taking advantage of some form of 
comparative advantage in local production.10  
In this setting, factors that affect trade - such 
as transaction costs or exchange rate 
uncertainty - will have different implications 
for foreign investment depending on its trade-
substituting or trade-creating nature. To the 
extent that monetary integration boosts trade 
flows, it will also tend to fuel trade-creating 
FDI while hampering trade-substituting FDI.  
A similar argument can be made when 
looking at the specific role of exchange rate 
risks. Exchange rate fluctuations affect the 
stream of income from a foreign investment 
operation. Recent developments in 
investment theory have generally highlighted 
the negative impact of uncertainty on 
investment in the presence of sunk costs. In 
this context, the reduction of exchange rate 
risks11 associated with a single currency tends 
                                                      
8  For a review of the relevant literature see, for 
instance, Pain (2002). 
9  For instance, by establishing a distribution network. 
10  For instance, the existence of specific skills in the 
local labour force. 
11 It may be argued that, in the case of FDI, exchange 
rate uncertainty is essentially of a medium to long-run 
nature. Monetary integration suppresses short-term 
to be supportive of FDI. However, other 
arguments have also been put forward to 
defend a positive relation between exchange-
rate uncertainty and foreign investment. For 
instance, replacing exports with local 
production will make it possible to reduce the 
volatility of the stream of profits from a 
specific export market. In that case, monetary 
integration may lead to a reduction of FDI.  
Finally, to the extent that the euro exacerbates 
the positive effects of the creation of a truly 
internal market (leading to economies of scale 
and a larger home market) FDI will also be 
stimulated.  
2. Existing empirical research  
Trade and EMU  
Until the late 1990s, the potential impact of 
monetary integration on trade was widely 
believed to be positive but relatively small. 
This conclusion was underpinned by the fact 
that estimates of transaction costs were rather 
modest and that empirical studies had 
generally failed to find a strong negative 
relation between exchange rate uncertainty 
and trade.  
Research was given a new impulse after the 
publication of a seminal paper by A.K. Rose 
in 2000. Estimating a gravity model12 of trade 
flows for a large number of countries, Rose 
identified a large negative effect of exchange 
rate volatility on trade flows. He also found 
that trade flows between countries sharing a 
common currency were three times larger 
than flows between otherwise similar 
                                                                          
volatility but will only reduce long-term real exchange 
rate risks.  
12 The gravity model postulates that bilateral trade 
between two countries is proportional to the size of 
their GDPs and inversely proportional to the distance 
between them. The latter may be defined in such a 
way as to take into account all factors that create 
“distance”, including cultural and language 
differences, border effects, etc. 
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countries. This common currency effect came 
on top of the exchange rate volatility effect.  
Given its magnitude, Rose’s estimate of the 
common currency effect was initially greeted 
with substantial scepticism. Rose’s 
methodology was criticised on several 
grounds.13 Estimation techniques and models 
were subsequently refined and the estimated 
magnitude of the impact reduced. However, 
the overall conclusion of a very large effect of 
a common currency on trade was not altered 
significantly.  
Rose’s initial empirical evidence on the 
common currency effect rested essentially on 
small or poor countries. It was unclear, 
though, to what extent his results applied to 
EMU. However, in recent years, a number of 
studies have endeavoured to address the 
specific issue of the link between the euro and 
                                                      
13 For instance, the direction of the causality between 
trade and a single currency was unclear. Countries 
sharing a common currency may tend to trade more 
but countries may also adopt a common currency 
more easily when their trade links are strong.  
trade (see Table 6). Using pre-EMU data, Rose 
and van Wincoop (2001) estimate the potential 
impact of EMU on trade to be 50%. More 
significantly, with EMU now in its fifth year 
of existence, series on intra-euro-area trade 
begin to be sufficiently long to allow a direct 
measure of the role of EMU. At least three 
studies have so far attempted to do so:  
¾ Based on gravity model estimates for EU 
and EFTA countries, Barr et al. (2003) 
find that EMU has led to a 30% increase 
in intra-euro-area trade.  
¾ In Micco et al. (2003), the estimated impact 
of EMU is somewhat lower at 5-20%. 
Using also a gravity model, the authors 
obtain a range of estimates depending on 
the number of countries included in the 
analysis and the model specification used.  
¾ Finally, based on data for EU and non-
European G7 countries, Bun and Klaassen 
(2002) estimate a dynamic model of 
exports and reckon that the euro has 
increased trade by 4% in its first year with 
a long-term potential impact of 40%. 
Table 6: Selected empirical studies on the impact of currency unions on trade
Authors Methodology Estimated impact ofEMU/currency union on trade
General studies on impact of currency unions
Rose (2000) Gravity model Trippling of trade
Rose (2002) Review of existing studies Doubling of trade
Specific studies of impact of EMU
Rose and van Wincoop (2001) Pre-EMU data Potential increase in trade of 50%
Bun and Klaassen (2002)
Dynamic export model
Annual data 1965-2001 for EU and
non-European G7
4% increase in trade after one year,
10% after 3 years and potential
long-run effect of 40%
Barr, Breedon and Miles (2003)
Gravity model
Quarterly data 1978-2002 for EU +
EFTA countries
EMU has already added 28% to
trade among members
Micco, Stein and Ordõnez (2003)
Gravity model
Annual data 1992-2002 for 22
industrial countries or EU
EMU has translated into a 5-20%
increase of bilateral trade
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
 - 21 - 
The main conclusion that emerges from 
recent empirical studies is that EMU has 
already had a sizeable impact on intra-euro-
area trade flows and that the effect could 
increase further in the coming years.14 Some 
uncertainty remains as to the exact size of the 
EMU effect. Depending on the methodology 
used, the estimated impact on intra-euro-area 
trade flows varies between 5 and 50%. 
Although this is below Rose’s early estimates 
of the impact of currency unions on trade, the 
studies on EMU generally capture only the 
effect already embedded in the data. The 
EMU effect has probably not reached its 
maximum yet and its long-run impact will 
probably be closer to the upper than the lower 
end of the above range. 
                                                      
14  Such an EMU effect has also been identified in trade 
flows to and from individual Member States. For 
instance see Stephan (2002) for an estimation of 
German exports. 
Foreign direct investment and EMU  
Although the impact of the Single Market on 
European FDI flows has given rise to 
significant empirical research,15 the empirical 
literature on the effect of EMU is so far more 
sparse. A notable exception is Barr et al. 
(2003) who analyse the fall of FDI into the 
UK in the recent years and conclude that it 
cannot solely be explained by exchange rate 
effects and that it may also be a consequence 
of not adopting the euro.  
In contrast, the link between foreign direct 
investment and exchange rate uncertainty has 
generated a relatively large empirical literature. 
However, reflecting the complexity of the 
relation between uncertainty and investment, 
                                                      
15  For instance, Barrel and Pain (1999) conclude that the 
Single Market has increased the attractiveness of 
Europe as an investment destination for both EU and 
non-EU firms. 
 
Box 3: UK views on the impact of EMU on trade and FDI 
In June 2003, the UK government published its second assessment of the five economic tests relating to 
EMU entry (HM Treasury, 2003a). Several studies were prepared on specific relevant topics to act as a basis 
for this assessment. The link between EMU and trade was addressed in a specific study (HM Treasury, 
2003b). The EMU effects on FDI were analysed in a study on EMU and business sectors (HM Treasury 
2003c). 
Effect of EMU on trade 
On the basis of existing empirical research, the study concludes that there is reasonably robust evidence that 
EMU has boosted intra-euro trade since 1999. The main finding of the study is that UK membership of the 
euro area could lead to a potential increase in UK trade with the euro area of 5 and 50 per cent, without any 
trade diversion from non-euro-area countries. It acknowledges that the upper estimate is closer to the more 
likely long-term outcome. Apart from increased trade within EMU, the study concludes that increased trade 
integration with the euro area would be beneficial for long-term UK growth: each 1 percentage point increase 
in the trade to GDP ratio increases real GDP per head at least 1/3 per cent (but possibly 2/3 per cent) in the 
long run. This suggests EMU membership could potentially raise output per head in the UK in the long term 
by between 4½ and 9¼ per cent or between 0.15 and 0.30 percentage points a year over a 30-year period. 
However, as the study points out, these estimates are surrounded by substantial uncertainty and depend on 
sustained convergence of the UK economy with the euro area. 
Effect of EMU on FDI 
The study concludes that EMU is likely to boost FDI in the euro area over time. In this context, UK 
membership of EMU on the right basis would lead to an increase of bilateral FDI flows between the UK and 
the euro area. The study acknowledges that the UK’s share of EU FDI has dropped since the launch of the 
euro. However, it also emphasises that FDI flows have been affected by many factors in recent years and that 
it is therefore difficult to say with confidence that EMU has already boosted FDI within the euro area.  
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studies have tended to produce contradictory 
conclusions. To give a few examples:  
¾ Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) explore the 
effect of short-run exchange rate volatility 
on US trade flows with Canada, Japan and 
the UK and find a positive relation 
between volatility and FDI.  
¾ Working with a sample of OECD 
countries, De Ménil (1999) also reports a 
significant positive effect of exchange rate 
volatility on FDI.  
¾ In contrast, Barrell et al. (2003) find that 
US firms investing in Europe tend to be 
risk-averse and to lower their investments 
as exchange rate volatility rises.  
3. Recent trends in trade and FDI 
Intra and extra-euro-area trade 
Trade flows to and from the euro area 
increased quite rapidly in the 1990s. As shown 
in the graph below, both intra and extra-euro-
area trade of goods rose continuously as a 
share of GDP, between 1994 and 2000. 
Reflecting the traditional strong response of 
trade to fluctuations in activity, the current 
cyclical downswing has brought this 
expansion to a halt since 2001. 16  
Real trade in goods, euro area (1)
(as a share of GDP)
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(1) Trade is measured as the sum of imports and exports.
Source: Commission services.  
                                                      
16 In the absence of adequate trade data on services, the 
graphs presented here are based on trade in goods. 
Developments in euro-area trade in the 1990s 
have been dominated by globalisation and 
surging world trade. This explains the 
continuous slide of the share of intra-euro-
area trade in total euro-area trade volumes 
during most of the 1990s (see next graph). 
The slide came to halt in 1998-99 on the back 
of the Asian crisis. Since the late 1990s, the 
launch of EMU has probably helped to 
mitigate the overall downward trend of the 
share of intra-euro-area trade.  
Share of intra-euro-area trade in total 
euro-area trade of goods in volume (1) 
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(1) Trade is measured as the sum of imports and exports.
Source: Commission services.  
A positive EMU effect on trade is clearly 
visible when restricting the analysis to EU 
countries. The next graph shows trade with 
the euro area for EMU countries on the one 
hand (i.e. intra-euro-area trade) and for the 
three EU countries not belonging to EMU, on 
the other. Trade is expressed as a share of the 
GDP of the regions considered.  
Real trade in goods with the euro-area(1), euro area  and 
other countries
(as a share of each region's GDP)
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(1) Trade is measured as the sum of imports and exports.
(2) UK, DK and S.
Source: Commission services.  
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Since the late 1990s, trade within the euro area 
has clearly expanded more rapidly than trade 
between EMU Member States and the other 
three EU countries. It is interesting to note 
that the two curves already start to diverge in 
1998, suggesting that exporters may have 
anticipated the launch of EMU.  
The EMU effect on trade identified in the 
graph can be confirmed statistically with the 
help of a simple trade model relating Member 
States’ trade with the euro area to a time trend 
and a dummy variable capturing a possible 
EMU effect (see Box 4). The main conclusion 
from the estimation of such a model is that 
trade flows with the euro area have increased 
significantly for EMU members since the start 
of EMU in 1999. The estimated effect of 
EMU on import flows ranges between 7 and 
18% depending on the estimation strategy 
adopted. The range can be considered as 
conservative to the extent that it only captures 
the impact that is already visible in the data up 
to 2002 and that the full effect may not yet 
have been reached. No shift in trade is 
observed for the EU countries which have 
not adopted the euro. 
Foreign direct investment into and from 
the euro area 
The late 1990s have seen a massive increase of 
FDI flows to and from the euro area. 
According to Eurostat, annual outward FDI 
flows from EMU countries rose from 110 
billion euro in 1996 to close to 680 billion 
euro in 2000.17 The surge was even more 
remarkable in the case of inward FDI flows 
which multiplied 11-fold over the same 
period, climbing from about 60 to 690 billion 
euro.  
The current slowdown has taken its toll on 
direct investment, with outwards and inwards 
flows falling respectively to 370 and 320 
billion euro in 2001. Nevertheless, these 
figures remain high by historical standards, 
                                                      
17 Eurostat data cover both intra-euro-area and extra-
euro-area FDI.  
suggesting that the increase in direct 
investment in the late 1990s was not purely a 
cyclical phenomenon. 18 
Foreign direct investment, euro area (1)
(level in billion euro)
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(1) FDI data include both intra and extra-euro-area flows.
Source: Commission services.  
The surge in foreign direct investment in the 
late 1990s is part of a broad globalisation 
trend that has affected most industrialised 
countries. Most OECD countries experienced 
a significant increase in FDI flows over the 
period. Potential explanations for this trend 
include the growing importance of 
multinational enterprises, deregulation, 
investment-friendly policies in a number of 
countries19 and cross-border consolidation in 
ICT-related sectors.20  
In addition, developments in direct 
investment in the late 1990s can also be put 
down to the equity price bubble that built-up 
during that period. It is noteworthy that FDI 
flows in recent years have been largely 
dominated by mergers and acquisitions of 
existing businesses as opposed to greenfield 
investment. As a result, the factors which 
contributed to fuel equity prices, including  
                                                      
18 No Eurostat data is available for 2002 yet. ECB data 
show a further fall in extra-euro area FDI in 2002 but 
both outwards and inwards direct investment remain 
largely above their 1996 level. 
19 Among which the privatisation of state-owned utilities 
was of major importance.  
20 For a general discussion of recent FDI trends see 
OECD (2003).  
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Box 4: Identifying an EMU effect in a simple trade model 
The present box assesses the effect of EMU on trade by means of a simple econometric model, relating trade 
with the euro area to a constant, a dummy and possibly a time trend. The following two equations were 
estimated on a panel of time-series trade data for EU countries: 
S(i,t) = CONST(i) + a(i)*DUM(t) + e(i,t) 
S(i,t) = CONST(i) + a(i)*DUM(t) + b*TIME + e(i,t) 
where  S is the Log of the trade share (the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to and from the euro 
area to GDP, with all variables in current prices), 
DUM is a dummy variable equal to one after 1998, 
TIME is a time trend, 
e is a random error term, 
t and i are subscripts for time and for EMU membership (1 for members, 2 for non-members). 
The estimated panel consisted of two country aggregates made respectively of euro-area member countries, 
on the one hand, and of the UK and Denmark, on the other. Due to data limitations, Austria, Finland 
Portugal and Sweden had to be excluded from the analysis. Trade shares were constructed from quarterly 
national account and custom data. Trade data including both goods and services were taken from national 
accounts. Custom data were used to split total trade into its intra-euro-area and extra-euro-area components. 
The two equations were estimated over the 1991Q1 to 2002Q4 period.  
A pooled estimation makes it possible to control for common effects across the two aggregates such as a 
common trade trend, for example. The tests of the estimated coefficients for “a(1)” and “a(2)” makes it 
possible to check whether changes in intra-euro-area trade after the launch of EMU are statistically significant 
for the “EMU group” and “the non-EMU group” respectively.  
Estrimated impact of EMU on intra-euro-area trade(1)
(% increase in real trade level)
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(high estimate)
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(low estimate)
%
(1) Estimates based on a panel regression of EU Member States' trade flows.  See text for explantions.
Source: Commission services.  
Overall, as shown in the graph above, the estimated equations confirm the existence of a substantial positive 
effect of EMU on intra-euro-area trade. The size of the effect depends on the specification used.  
In the case of the first equation, the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable indicates that intra-euro-area 
trade has increased by about 18% since the start of EMU in 1999. In the meantime, there has been no 
significant increase in trade between the euro area, on the one hand, and the UK and Denmark, on the other 
(the estimate of “a(2)” is not statistically different from zero). These estimates neglect possible other trade 
integration effects unrelated to EMU, such as lower transportation costs, for example. The second equation 
allows for a time trend in the regression in order to capture autonomous trade integration effects. This 
produces a more cautious estimate of the effect of EMU with an increase in intra-euro-area trade of about 
7%. It is worth stressing that both estimates of the impact of EMU may be considered as conservative insofar 
as they are based on data running to 2002. The impact of EMU on trade may not have been fully felt at this 
point in time and may be larger than is captured in the above estimations. 
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easy access to equity capital and excessive profit 
expectations, probably also boosted foreign 
direct investment activity. Furthermore, inflated 
stock prices also had a direct impact on the 
statistical valuation of those FDI operations 
consisting of acquisitions of large shares in 
quoted companies.  
Outward foreign direct investment, euro area, 
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At the euro-area level, this broad globalisation 
trend is clearly visible when decomposing euro-
area FDI into intra and extra-euro area flows. 
As shown in the previous graph, the increase of 
total euro-area FDI outflows in the late 1990s is 
the result of a simultaneous surge of intra-euro-
area investment and of outflows from the euro 
area to the rest of the world. The latter can 
clearly not be attributed to an EMU effect and 
reflects the broad globalisation that has affected 
most OECD countries.  
Inward foreign direct investment, 
euro area, USA and UK (1)
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(1) Euro-area data includes both intra-euro-area and extra-euro-area flows. 
Source: Commission services.  
Nevertheless, globalisation alone cannot explain 
all recent developments in euro-area FDI. The 
analysis of inward FDI flows indicates that the 
euro area became a comparatively more 
attractive location for foreign investment in the 
late 1990s. During that period, the share of 
inward FDI in GDP increased more markedly 
in the euro area than in the USA and, to a lesser 
degree, in the UK.21 Despite significant 
cutbacks in foreign investment in the current 
downturn, the share of inward FDI in GDP 
remained sizeably higher in the euro area in 
2001, at 4.7% compared with 3.7% in the UK 
and 1.2% in the USA.  
Inward foreign direct investment, 
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(1) EU data include both intra-EU and extra-EU data.
Source: Commission services.  
Recent FDI inflows into the euro area have 
probably been partly fostered by EU-wide 
factors, including the Internal Market and the 
associated cross-border consolidation of the 
EU industry, the privatisation of state-owned 
companies and the deregulation of public 
utilities. Nevertheless, a comparison of recent 
developments in EU countries not belonging to 
EMU with developments in the euro area 
points to a significant impact of the single 
currency on foreign investment. As shown in 
the above graph, the share of non-EMU 
countries in total inward investment into the 
EU15 has decreased sharply since the launch of 
the euro, falling from 37% to 20% between 
1998 and 2001. Tentative and partial data 
available for 2002, suggest that the fall 
continued last year and that the share of non-
                                                      
21 FDI data may be distorted by very large M&A 
operations. In 2000, FDI into the euro area was boosted 
by the acquisition of Mannesmann (Germany) by 
Vodafone (UK). However, the surge in inward FDI into 
the euro area in the late 1990s remains remarkable even 
when excluding this very large acquisition. 
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EMU countries may have been cut further by 
about a half. This indicates that the increased 
attractiveness of the euro area as a destination 
for foreign investment is, at least partly, 
attributable to EMU. 
It is important to stress that the EMU effect on 
FDI identified in the above graph actually 
covers two factors. First, the single currency 
may have increased the attractiveness of the 
euro area as a basis for foreign investment due 
to a number of factors including the 
suppression of intra-euro-area exchange rate 
risks. Second, the weakness of the euro 
exchange rate made euro-area assets quite 
attractive during the first years of EMU. Given 
that FDI data are only available to 2001, these 
two factors are difficult to disentangle. 
Turning to the origin of FDI inflows into the 
euro area, the launch of EMU has gone hand in 
hand with a large increase in intra-euro-area 
FDI and a significant drop in of the share of 
extra-euro-area direct investment in total direct 
investment. From a peak of 55% in 1998 the 
share dropped to 49% in 2001, suggesting a 
more significant impact of EMU on intra-euro-
area FDI flows than on investment by non-
EMU countries into the euro area (see next 
graph).  
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It is however worth stressing that investment 
by non-EMU countries into the euro area also 
surged in the late 1990s, increasing in particular 
more rapidly than inward FDI into the UK or 
the USA. Hence, it is quite possible that EMU 
has stimulated both cross-border investment 
between EMU countries and investment from 
non-EMU countries into the euro area.  
Overall, recent developments in FDI data are 
compatible with a positive “EMU” effect on 
foreign investment into the euro area. As FDI 
has been affected by a number of other factors 
since the late 1990s, the magnitude of this 
EMU effect is difficult to assess. In particular, 
the impact of the relative weakness of the euro 
exchange rate in the early years of EMU is 
difficult to disentangle from a broader EMU 
effect without resorting to a proper 
econometric model.  
4. Conclusion 
Available empirical evidence points to a sizeable 
effect of EMU on trade and, possibly, foreign 
direct investment in the euro area.  
Several empirical studies are now available 
which, based on estimated trade models, all 
conclude that the euro has already had a large 
impact on intra-euro-area trade. Depending on 
the studies considered, the effect of EMU on 
intra-euro-area import flows is estimated to 
range between 5 and 50%. There is also some 
evidence that the EMU effect on trade has not 
reached its maximum yet. As existing estimates 
generally only capture the effect already 
embedded in existing data, the long-run impact 
of EMU is probably closer to the upper end of 
this range.  
In contrast, empirical evidence is more limited 
in the case of foreign investment. An analysis of 
recent FDI flows indicates that the 
attractiveness of the euro area as a destination 
for foreign investment has increased 
significantly since the launch of the euro. 
However, FDI is determined by a large number 
of factors, among which the magnitude of a 
positive effect of EMU is difficult to assess.  
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IV. Key indicators for the euro area 
1 Output 2001 2002 2003* Apr-03 May-03 Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -9.833 -11.58   -12 -12 -12 -14 -11 -9
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 0.225 -0.858   0.4 -1 0.1 0.6     
  2001 2002 2003* 02 Q1 02Q2 02Q3 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Ann. % ch 1.5 0.8 1.8 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.2
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch       0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1
2 Private consumption 2001 2002 2003* Apr-03 May-03 Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -6.083 -10.58   -19 -20 -19 -18 -17 -17
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 1.325 1.3167   1.6 -0.7 0       
  2001 2002 2003* 02 Q1 02Q2 02Q3 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 
 Private consumption 2.3 qoq %ch. 1.8 0.6 1.7 -0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.1
3 Investment 2001 2002 2003* 02 Q1 02Q2 02Q3 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 83.525 81.2   81.1 81.2 81 81.5 81.1 80.8
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch -0.3 -1.9 2 -0.7 -1.3 0.1 0.2 -1.22 -0.4
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.1 0.1
4 Labour market 2001 2002 2003* Apr-03 May-03 Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 
 Unemployment 4.1 %  8 8.2 8.3 8.8 8.8 8.9 8.9     
  2001 2002 2003* 02 Q1 02Q2 02Q3 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.5 0 0 0   
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 7.8 3.8   5 4 3 3 3   
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.8   
5 International transactions  2001 2002 2003* Apr-03 May-03 Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -14.25 -22   -25 -26 -29 -28     
 World trade 5.2 Bn. EUR 6454 6309   504 487 479 487     
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 767.4 776.9 823.4 85.4 85.1 85.9 91.5     
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 802.2 781.6 828.1 82.4 80.6 79.2 79.3     
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR -34.8 -4.7 -4.7 3 4.5 6.7 12.2     
  2001 2002 2003* 02 Q1 02Q2 02Q3 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 4.3 0.7 6.1 -0.2 2.1 1.5 -0.4 -1.2 -0.5
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 2.1 -1.6 6.2 -1.3 1.5 1.5 0.2 0.1 0
  2001 2002 2003* Apr-03 May-03 Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR -12.3 9.6 11 -1 2 2.5 0     
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -104.6 -90.4   -19.8 -0.3 23.7 -3.6     
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR 36.5 38   5.4 7 12.9 -35.3     
6 Prices  2001 2002 2003* Apr-03 May-03 Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.5 2.2 2 2.1 1.9 2 1.9 2.1   
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 2 2   2.2 2 2 1.9     
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 2.2083 1.7333   1.7 1.3         
 Import prices 6.4 Ann. % ch 0.4 -1.4 0.3             
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2001 2002 2003* Apr-03 May-03 Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 4.265 3.3   2.54 2.46 2.15 2.13 2.4 2.15
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 5 4.8   4.16 3.9 3.64 3.95 4.15 4.23
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 3.25 2.75 2.5 2.5 2 2 2 2
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 4046.8 3053   2278.3 2301 2443.3 2459.8 2524.1 2585.1
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 5.2667 5.6   8.2 8.3 8.5       
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 7.9 7.65   4.6 4.6 4.5 4.9     
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 0.9 0.94 0.98 1.0854 1.15 1.166 1.14 1.11 1.11
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 80.1 82.2 83.7 104.89 108.54 108.71  107.30  106.16 105.72
*     ECFIN Spring 2003 forecasts (European Economy, No 2/2003 -April 2003) 
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output  
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption  
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment  
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market  
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Number of employees, partially estimated, seasonally adjusted ECB/ 
Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Not fully harmonised concept, but representative for each Member State 
(mostly hourly earnings) 
ECFIN 
5 International 
transactions 
 
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 World trade Bn; EUR, current prices, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.3 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.4 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.5 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.6 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.8 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions; before 1997 partly estimated ECB 
5.9 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions ECB 
5.10 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions ECB 
6 Prices  
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit values for goods Eurostat 
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7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Datastream
7.2 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Datastream
7.3 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Datastream
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Datastream
7.5 M3  Annual percentage growth rate of seasonally adjusted flows, moving average 
(3 last months): from 1997 onwards corrected for holdings by non-residents  
ECB 
7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
Annual percentage change, MFI loans to euro area residents excluding MFIs 
and general government, monthly values: month end values, annual values: 
annual averages 
ECB 
7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages, until December 1998: USD/ECU rates ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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Comments on the report would be gratefully received and should be sent to: 
 
Servaas Deroose 
Director - Economy of the euro zone and the Union  
Economic and Financial Affairs Directorate-General  
European Commission 
Rue de la loi 200   BU1 0/209 
B-1049 Brussels 
 
or by e-mail to francoise.briard@cec.eu.int or servaas.deroose@cec.eu.int 
 
 
